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ESSAY




The United States is seeing a wave of explicit anti-transgender animus,
expressed in the form of legislation banishing transgender individuals from
full participation in public life.1 In Montana, such a measure was defeated
in the Legislature in the 2017 session.2 HB 609 would have discriminated
against transgender individuals by prohibiting them from using the rest-
room, locker room, or changing facility in a government building or under
public control that corresponds with their gender identity.3 Following the
House Judiciary Committee’s rejection of HB 609, the Montana Family
Foundation began collecting signatures on ballot initiative I-183, a nearly
* Executive Director, ACLU of Montana. A version of this essay was delivered as the University
of Montana Constitution Day Lecture on September 19, 2017. The author thanks Justice James C. Nel-
son, S.K. Rossi, and Professor Anthony Johnstone for helpful conversations on the topic of this essay.
1. See, e.g., H.R. 2, General Assembly of 2015–2016, 2d Spec. Sess. (N.C. 2016) (partially re-
pealed by H.R. 142, General Assembly of 2017–2018, Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017)). President Trump also
issued a Presidential Memorandum on August 25, 2017, banning transgender individuals from serving in
the United States military. Military Service by Transgender Individuals, 82 Fed. Reg. 41319 (Aug. 25,
2017). The President’s action was challenged in multiple lawsuits and is currently preliminarily en-
joined. Doe v. Trump, Civil Action No. 17-1597 (CKK), ___ F. Supp. 3d. ___, 2017 WL 4873042
(D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2017). See infra note 130.
2. Generally Revise Privacy Laws Concerning Protected Facilities, H.R. 609, 65th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Mont. 2017).
3. Id. § 4.
1
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identical measure to HB 609, with the intent of placing it on the ballot in
2018.4
What does the Montana Constitution say about the anti-transgender
discrimination embodied in measures like HB 609 and I-183? Surely such
legislation is unconstitutional because it classifies on the basis of sex.5 But
that answer does not begin to do justice to the harms transgender discrimi-
nation inflicts. And the Montana Constitution does not limit the analysis to
this answer. In fact, it compels a deeper analysis that is rooted in the princi-
ple of dignity that expressly undergirds Montana’s constitutional protec-
tions against discrimination.6
II. BACKGROUND FACTS ABOUT TRANSGENDER STATUS
A transgender person (also referred to as a “trans person”), is an indi-
vidual whose gender identity does not correspond to the sex they were as-
signed at birth.7 In contrast, a cisgender person is one whose gender identity
corresponds to the sex they were assigned at birth.8 Many transgender per-
sons seek to bring their appearance into alignment with their gender iden-
tity. This is commonly referred to as “transition.”9 Gender identity is differ-
ent from sexual orientation. Sexual orientation describes a person’s endur-
ing physical, romantic, or emotional attraction to another person (e.g.,
straight, gay, lesbian, bisexual).10 Gender identity describes a person’s in-
ternal, personal sense of being a man or a woman, or of being outside of the
gender binary.11
Discrimination against transgender persons is widespread and has dev-
astating effects. Transgender individuals are subject to high rates of vio-
lence, including murder.12 This is especially true of trans women of color.13
Studies have also repeatedly shown a higher risk of suicide among trans-
gender persons. Forty percent of transgender adults reported having made a
suicide attempt, compared with 4.6% of the general public.14 And often
4. See Revised Ballot Language for Initiative No. 183 (I-183), MONT. SEC’Y OF STATE, https://per
ma.cc/Z4DN-VXHG) (last visited Jan. 13, 2016).
5. See infra notes 63–68, (discussion of transgender discrimination as sex discrimination).
6. See MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 4; see also infra note 95 (discussion of dignity analysis).
7. Transgender Facts, MAYO CLINIC, https://perma.cc/Y4BJ-2LWY (last visited Jan. 13, 2018).
8. Id.




12. Maggie Astor, Violence Against Transgender People Is on the Rise, Advocates Say, THE NEW
YORK TIMES (Nov. 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/ZM74-FAGF.
13. Id.
14. Sandy E. James et. al, The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, NAT’L CTR. FOR
TRANSGENDER EQUAL. 10 (Dec. 2016), https://perma.cc/RS43-7NCS.
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these suicide attempts occur at young ages. Ninety-two percent of trans-
gender individuals reporting having attempted suicide reported having first
done so before the age of twenty-five.15
Transgender suicide rates are influenced by outside stressors. Studies
suggest that “negative experiences related to anti-transgender bias” contrib-
ute to the increased prevalence of suicide attempts among transgender peo-
ple.16 Stressors that affect transgender people include: societal transphobia,
internalized transphobia, family rejection, lack of social support, physical
violence, and discrimination (for example in health care, employment, ac-
commodations, and housing).17 The evidence suggests that elevated rates of
self-harm among transgender people are not due solely to being trans-
gender. For instance, research shows that each episode of victimization,
such as physical or verbal harassment or abuse, increases the likelihood of
self-harming behavior by two-and-a-half times on average.18 Further, being
seen as transgender is a greater risk factor. Trans people report improved
mental health-related quality of life when they have had access to surgery,
such as facial feminization surgery, that allows them to “pass” in public as
the gender they identify with, without being recognized as transgender.19
III. BATHROOM PANIC LEGISLATION
Legislative efforts to sanction discrimination against transgender peo-
ple have proliferated in recent years. The most common form of such legis-
lation at the state level is sometimes referred to as “bathroom panic legisla-
tion.” Bathroom panic legislation prohibits transgender people from using
restrooms or other public facilities, such as locker rooms, in accordance
with their gender identity.20 Instead, they are forced to use the facility that
corresponds to the sex they were assigned at birth (or, in some cases, to use
a separate, unisex, single-person facility).
Montana HB 609, which was defeated in the Montana House Judiciary
Committee in 2017, is a typical example. The bill mandated that individuals
use the public facility (bathroom, locker room, or any “facility in which a
person may be in a state of undress in the presence of others”) according to
15. Id. at 115.
16. Ann P. Haas, Philip L. Rodgers & Jody L. Herman, Suicide Attempts Among Transgender and
Gender Non-Conforming Adults: Findings of the National Transgender Discrimination Survey, WIL-
LIAMS INST. 12–13 (Jan. 2014), https://perma.cc/J8SJ-CUKK.
17. Id. at 11–13.
18. Id. at 2.
19. Tiffany A. Ainsworth & Jeffrey H. Spiegel, Quality of Life of Individuals with and Without
Facial Feminization Surgery or Gender Reassignment Surgery, 19 QUALITY OF LIFE RESEARCH 1019
(Sep. 2010).
20. See Scott Shackford, Transgender Bathroom Panic Legislation Comes to Texas, HIT & RUN
BLOG (Jan. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/26MV-MRE6.
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a person’s “sex,” defined as “a person’s immutable biological sex as objec-
tively determined by anatomy and genetics existing at the time of birth.”21
“[S]tate of undress” was not defined.22 The bill allowed a person who en-
countered an individual perceived to be of the opposite sex in a public facil-
ity to bring a lawsuit for “compensatory damages for all emotional or
mental distress” against the government entity or public school that controls
the facility.23 Ballot measure I-183, which the Montana Family Foundation
aims to put on the ballot in November 2018, is virtually identical to HB
609.24
Campaigns for bathroom panic legislation or opposing local non-dis-
crimination ordinances that protect transgender people from discrimination
have been full of vitriol and grave misunderstandings of what it means to be
transgender. For example, an advertisement in a campaign against Hous-
ton’s non-discrimination ordinance (“NDO”) claimed, “This ordinance will
allow men to freely go into women’s bathrooms, locker rooms, and show-
ers. That is filthy, that is disgusting, and that is unsafe.”25 Campaign talking
points asserted that the NDO would allow “more perverted men to become
bold in acting out their perversion” and “sex offenders to roam around pub-
lic bathrooms.”26 Hysterical claims that NDOs would permit men to enter
women’s restrooms stigmatizes transgender women by denying their iden-
tity and perpetuating the belief that they are not women.
Bathroom panic did not originate with the recent anti-transgender cam-
paigns and legislation. As one commentator puts it, “For more than 100
years, Americans have projected their most profound fears about social
change onto public restrooms.”27 Bathroom panic has historically been used
to oppress and shame, and to keep certain groups locked out of full partici-
pation in society. Bathrooms were among the racially segregated public ac-
21. Mont. H.R. 609, § 3.
22. Id. § 3.
23. Id. § 5.
24. See Revised Ballot Language for Initiative No. 183 (I-183), supra note 4. The ACLU of Mon- R
tana successfully challenged the legal sufficiency of the Attorney General’s original ballot statement for
I-183. ACLU of Mont. Found., Inc. v. State, 403 P.2d 1244 (Mont. 2017). The statement was revised,
and the Montana Family Foundation began collecting signatures anew. On October 17, 2017, the ACLU
of Montana, on behalf of ten individual plaintiffs as well as the cities of Missoula and Bozeman, filed a
complaint challenging the constitutionality of I-183. Compl. for Declaratory and Injuctive Relief,
Hobaugh, et al. v. State (Mont. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Oct. 17, 2017) (No. CDV-17-0673), available at https:/
/perma.cc/35EZ-XV3A.
25. Zack Ford, Opponents of Houston’s LGBT Protections Call Trans Women ‘Filthy, Disgusting,
and Unsafe’, THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 24, 2015), https://perma.cc/6Z99-CVPC.
26. Zack Ford, How Conservatives are Trying to Derail Houston’s LGBT Nondiscrimination Ordi-
nance, THINKPROGRESS (May 15, 2014), https://perma.cc/A4AJ-BYNN.
27. Neil J. Young, How the Bathroom Wars Shaped America, POLITICO MAGAZINE (May 18, 2016),
https://perma.cc/Q6CA-XKED.
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commodations enforced by the Jim Crow laws.28 Phyllis Schlafly, the John
Birch Society, and others stoked panic about the supposedly frightening
specter of unisex bathrooms in a successful battle against the Equal Rights
Amendment.29
One transgender teenager’s struggle against bathroom panic has made
him a national hero. Gavin Grimm transitioned to being male while in high
school in Virginia.30 He consulted with and received the support of school
officials, who eventually allowed him to use the boys’ restroom.31 Gavin
used the boys’ restroom without incident for almost two months.32 At this
point, certain members of the community became aware of Gavin’s use of
the boys’ restroom and complained to the school board.33 In November and
December 2014, the school board met to consider a resolution that would
prevent Gavin from continuing to use the boys’ restroom.34 Gavin spoke to
the school board to plead for respect. “All I want to do is be a normal child
and use the restroom in peace,” Gavin explained, “and I have had no
problems from students to do that—only from adults.”35 He reminded the
school board members that he “did not ask to be this way, and it’s one of
the most difficult things anyone can face. . . . I am just a human. I am just a
boy.”36 The teenager’s courageous testimony was met by a hostile audience
of detractors eager to condemn him, some calling him a “young lady,” a
“freak,” or likening him to a person who seeks to urinate on fire hydrants
because he thinks he is a dog.37 The board then adopted the policy by a vote
of 6-1.38
In 2016, the United States Department of Education and United States
Department of Justice jointly issued a guidance letter to public schools on
how to treat transgender students under Title IX. In the letter, the depart-
ments explained that schools must “treat a student’s gender identity as the
student’s sex for purposes of Title IX and its implementing regulations.
This means that a school must not treat a transgender student differently
28. Raina Lipsitz, What Jim Crow Laws Teach Us About North Carolina’s Bathroom Legislation,
BUSTLE (May 24, 2016), https://perma.cc/US5Y-EPVF.
29. Young, supra note 27; Amanda Terkel, Bathroom Panic Has Long Stood in the Way of Equal R
Rights: The Woman’s Movement and Now the LGBT Movement Have Run up Against Restroom Fears,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 24, 2016), https://perma.cc/HHV5-DXWN.
30. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 715–16 (4th Cir. 2016).
31. Id. 715–16.
32. Id. 715–16
33. Id. at 716.
34. Id.
35. Br. in Opp’n at 7, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 2016 WL 4938270 at *7
(U.S. Sep. 13, 2016) (No. 16-273).
36. Id. at *7–8.
37. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 716.
38. Id.
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from the way it treats other students of the same gender identity.”39 Gavin
Grimm challenged his treatment by the school board in federal court, rely-
ing on the 2016 guidance. The district court dismissed Gavin’s Title IX
claim and denied his request for a preliminary injunction.40 The Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals sided with Gavin, deferring to the federal govern-
ment’s interpretation that Title IX’s prohibition on sex discrimination in-
cludes discrimination against transgender students.41
The school board then appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari.42 On February 22, 2017, while Gavin’s case was
pending before the Supreme Court, the Trump administration rescinded the
guidance.43 The Court then sent the case back to the Fourth Circuit.44 Se-
nior Judge Andre Davis, joined by Judge Henry Floyd, issued a concurrence
to the Fourth Circuit’s order granting an unopposed motion to vacate the
district court’s preliminary injunction.45 In his opinion, Judge Davis placed
Gavin alongside “brave individuals . . . who refused to accept quietly the
injustices that were perpetuated against them.”46 He likened Gavin to Dred
Scott, Fred Korematsu, Linda Brown, Mildred and Richard Loving, Edie
Windsor, and Jim Obergefell.47
What do these individuals have in common? What is it about their
courageous battles that aligns them with Gavin Grimm and others like him?
Judge Davis saw that the common thread in discrimination based on race,
sexual orientation, and gender identity is an affront to human dignity. “G.G.
takes his place among other modern-day human rights leaders who strive to
ensure that, one day, equality will prevail, and that the core dignity of every
one of our brothers and sisters is respected by lawmakers and others who
wield power over their lives.”48 Moreover, Judge Davis recognized that dig-
nity is not implicated every time a person is treated unequally. He wrote,
“G.G.’s case is about much more than bathrooms. It’s about a boy asking
his school to treat him just like any other boy. It’s about protecting the
rights of transgender people in public spaces and not forcing them to exist
on the margins.”49
39. Catherine E. Lhamon & Vanita Gupta, Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students, U.S.
DEPT. OF EDUC., 3 (May 13, 2016), https://perma.cc/L7SM-DJPV.
40. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 747.
41. Id. at 723.
42. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2442 (2016).
43. Sandra Battle & T.E. Wheeler, II, Dear Colleague Letter, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC. 2 (Feb. 22,
2017), https://perma.cc/RQ64-TEH3.
44. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
45. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 853 F.3d at 730 (4th Cir. 2017) (Davis, J., concurring).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 731 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 730 (emphasis added).
6
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IV. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS AND TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION
Judge Davis’ insights identify the core of the harm transgender dis-
crimination causes in a way that federal court decisions on discrimination,
as well as Montana Supreme Court decisions applying the Montana Consti-
tution’s Equal Protection Clause, typically have not. Equal protection juris-
prudence has had a hard time articulating the distinct harms that discrimina-
tion causes when directed against a group that has historically suffered op-
pression. Federal and Montana court opinions have held that discriminatory
laws are subject to strict scrutiny when their classifications are “arbitrary”50
or “suspect,” or when they reflect a “bare . . . desire to harm a politically
unpopular group.”51 Whether a particular classification qualifies as suspect
or arbitrary has not always been intuitive. Classes that the Supreme Court
has expressly held to be suspect, or to warrant at least heightened scrutiny,
include: race, sex, national origin, alienage, and being born out of wed-
lock.52 At the same time, the Supreme Court has failed to acknowledge the
suspect status of other subordinate classes, such as the poor, the elderly, or
persons with disabilities.53
The courts have sometimes relied on a set of factors to determine
whether a classification is suspect or arbitrary. These factors include
whether the class has historically been subjected to discrimination; whether
the group lacks political power; and whether the group’s distinguishing
characteristic is immutable or beyond members’ control.54 However, the
courts have not offered much explanation for these factors, and they have
not always worked well in practice.55 One problem lies with the courts’
tendency to shift the analysis from “class” to “classifications” once a class
has been identified as suspect.56 Thus, once the Supreme Court held that
people of color were a suspect class (a class that meets the above factors), it
shifted to declaring that any classification based on race merits strict scru-
50. Godfrey v. Montana State Fish & Game Comm’n, 631 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Mont. 1981).
51. United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985).
52. Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the
Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 489 (1998) (citations omitted).
53. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Undignified: The Supreme Court, Racial Justice, and Dignity
Claims, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1, 18 (2017).
54. Yoshino, supra note 52, at 489; Donaldson v. State, 292 P. 3d 364, 401–02 (Mont. 2012) R
(Nelson, J., dissenting) (citing In re C.H., 683 P.2d 931, 938 (Mont. 1984)).
55. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 53, at 19 (discussing problems with the political vulnerability R
factor); Yoshino, supra note 52, at 494–95 (raising concerns about the immutability factor). R
56. Hutchinson, supra note 53, at 19. R
7
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tiny,57 even though, as a class, white people do not meet the factors of
historical discrimination or political vulnerability.58
This shift from class to classifications means that equal protection case
law too often relies mechanically on tiers of scrutiny without attention to
the human suffering that certain kinds of discrimination can cause. The
Montana Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Snetsinger v. Montana Univer-
sity System59 is an example of this. In Snetsinger, the Court held unconstitu-
tional the Montana University System’s policy prohibiting gay employees
from receiving insurance coverage for their same-sex domestic partners.60
While the outcome of the case was an important and significant step for-
ward for the rights of same-sex couples in Montana, the court’s opinion was
sterile, its conclusions pat. The court decided the policy was unconstitu-
tional under rational basis review, thus avoiding the question of what classi-
fication was appropriate.61 One can certainly imagine reasons why the
Court may have skirted that question. But from another perspective, it was a
missed opportunity to apply an interpretation of the Montana Equal Protec-
tion Clause more consistent with its location within the dignity provision of
the Montana Constitution.62
Federal cases specifically addressing transgender discrimination have
likewise often failed to give due attention to the way in which such discrim-
ination is an affront to dignity. Some federal courts have interpreted trans-
gender discrimination to be a form of sex discrimination, relying on case
law interpreting sex discrimination to include sex stereotyping. Since Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,63 discrimination on the basis of transgender iden-
tity has been recognized as discrimination “because of sex” under either the
equal protection clause, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, or the Gender
57. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223–24 (1995) (“[A]ny person, of whatever
race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial
classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.”).
58. Hutchinson, supra note 53, at 19. The same is true of sex classifications. See infra notes 69–71 R
59. 104 P.3d 445 (Mont. 2004).
60. Id. at 453.
61. Id. at 452. The Court decided that the University’s policy was not rationally related to its
purported grounding in Montana’s marriage laws because it allowed heterosexual unmarried couples to
receive benefits merely by signing an affidavit. Id. at 451. The Court was arguably stretching to reach
this conclusion, so as to avoid the question whether sexual orientation constitutes sex discrimination (or
is independently a suspect classification). See Id. at 457 (Nelson, J., concurring) (arguing that Montana
Constitution “should provide more protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation than the
Court’s Opinion in this case reflects.”); Snetsinger, 104 P.3d at 470 (Rice, J., dissenting) (questioning
the court’s factual premise that “any of the couples who signed the Affidavit ‘may choose not to
marry’”).
62. See id. 457 (Nelson, J., concurring).
63. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989) (holding that acting on the basis of
a sex stereotype is acting on the basis of sex under Title VII).
8
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Motivated Violence Act64 in the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits and by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.65 In Glenn v.
Brumby, the Eleventh Circuit held:
[D]iscrimination against a transgender individual because of her gender-
nonconformity is sex discrimination . . . .
. . .
All persons, whether transgender or not, are protected from discrimina-
tion on the basis of gender stereotype. . . . Because these protections are af-
forded to everyone, they cannot be denied to a transgender individual. The
nature of the discrimination is the same; it may differ in degree but not in
kind, and discrimination on this basis is a form of sex-based discrimination
that is subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.66
Courts interpreting Title IX may feel constrained by the fact that only
sex, not gender identity, is expressly mentioned in the statute.67 But even in
cases addressing discrimination against a transgender individual under the
Equal Protection Clause, courts have typically chosen to analyze the dis-
crimination as sex discrimination through sex stereotyping.68
The logic of these opinions is sound. But they do not go far enough.
Merely identifying transgender discrimination as sex discrimination based
on sex stereotyping—which may affect cisgender individuals as well—does
not highlight the unique way in which transgender discrimination violates
human dignity. As the court in Glenn recognized, sex stereotyping can go
both ways. Males can be denied jobs as nurses, for example.69 Ruth Bader
64. The GMVA was enacted as subtitle C of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. See 34
U.S.C.A. 12361 (West 2017).
65. Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034,
1051 (7th Cir. 2017); Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012);
Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566,
574–75 (6th Cir. 2004); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Fabian
v. Hospital of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509 (D. Conn. 2016) (agreeing that transgender discrimina-
tion is sex discrimination).
66. Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1317–19.
67. See, e.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085–86 (7th Cir. 1984) (suggesting
that history of Title VII indicates that “the phrase . . . prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex
should be given a narrow, traditional interpretation, which would also exclude transsexuals). But see
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv.s, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (declaring that “statutory prohibi-
tions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”).
68. See, e.g., Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1316–17; see also Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1051
(“[T]his case does not require us to reach the question of whether transgender status is per se entitled to
heightened scrutiny. It is enough to stay that, just as in Price Waterhouse, the record . . . shows sex
stereotyping.”).
69. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (state-supported university’s
policy of denying otherwise qualified males right to enroll for credit in its nursing school violated Equal
Protection Clause); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (holding that statute prohibiting
the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and females under the age of 18 “invidiously
discriminate[d] against males 18–20 years of age.”).
9
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Ginsburg famously relied on the strategy of using men as plaintiffs in early
sex discrimination cases.70 A mere classification is not sufficient to qualify
as an affront to dignity, however. A classification suffered by women—who
since time immemorial have suffered male oppression and rejection of their
intelligence, strength, and sanity as reasons to deny them equal participation
in society—is not qualitatively the same as a male being denied a stere-
otypically female job.71 Similarly, in the case of transgender discrimination,
it is not simply the fact of being subjected to a classification based on sex,
or even sex stereotyping, that is the problem. It is the way that society has
chosen to ridicule, humiliate, and vilify transgender people in order ulti-
mately to justify isolating and ostracizing them.
In Glenn, the court’s analysis was simple and straightforward. The un-
comfortable facts underlying the discrimination that Vandiver Elizabeth
Glenn endured were merely taken as evidence of gender stereotyping,
something that could happen to cisgender and transgender people, and men
and women, alike. In Glenn, those facts, however, included Sewell Brumby,
the head of the Georgia General Assembly’s Office of Legislative Counsel
where Glenn worked, telling Glenn that her appearing at work in women’s
clothing was not appropriate and asking her to leave the office.72
Brumby deemed her appearance inappropriate “[b]ecause [Glenn] was
a man dressed as a woman and made up as a woman.”73 Brumby further
stated that “it’s unsettling to think of someone dressed in women’s clothing
with male sexual organs inside that clothing,” and that “a male in women’s
clothing is ‘unnatural.’”74 This crude and degrading denial of Glenn’s very
identity as a woman is not remotely comparable to the stereotyping underly-
ing a nursing school’s refusal to admit a man.75 Indeed, in Mississippi Uni-
versity for Women v. Hogan,76 the Court did not even attempt to justify its
invalidation of the nursing school’s women-only admission policy as under-
mining male dignity. Even though the plaintiff was a man, the Court based
its reasoning in part on the notion that the policy was demeaning to women,
because it “tend[ed] to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an
exclusively woman’s job.”77
Federal equal protection law seemed poised to link discrimination
against oppressed groups with violations of human dignity when the United
70. See, e.g., David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women’s Rights in a Man’s
World, 2 LAW. & INEQ. 33, 54–57 (1984).
71. Id. at 58.
72. Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1314.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729–30 (1982).
76. Id. at 731.
77. Id. at 729-30.
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States Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education.78 In Brown,
the Court recognized that segregated schools were a stark, official symbol
and reminder of Black children’s subordinate social status.79 The Court saw
that segregation was an official badge of inferiority imposed by society, not
merely a figment of Black persons’ imagination, as the Court suggested in
Plessy v. Ferguson.80 Bruce Ackerman describes this badge of inferiority as
“institutionalized humiliation.”81 In Brown, the Court saw how such institu-
tionalized humiliation could harm children, potentially “affect[ing] their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”82
Ackerman describes the “institutionalized humiliation” recognized in
the Court’s opinion as Brown’s “lost logic.”83 Not long after Brown, the
Court moved toward the more formalistic anti-classification approach to
discrimination that has come to characterize equal protection analysis even
today.84 Ackerman traces this approach to the Court’s decision in Loving v.
Virginia.85 In Loving, the Court applied strict scrutiny to Virginia’s ban on
marriages between white persons and persons of color, holding that, “At the
very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications,
especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to the ‘most rigid scru-
tiny.’”86 The Virginia statute did not ban interracial marriages across the
board, but rather was addressed specifically to marriages involving a white
person: “It shall hereafter be unlawful for any white person in this State to
marry any save a white person.”87 The Court recognized the racist motiva-
tion for the statute, but aside from an unexplored reference to white
78. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
79. Id. at 494 (“[T]he policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority
of the negro group.”).
80. 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (“We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to
consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a
badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the
colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”).
81. BRUCE ACKERMAN, 3 WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 129 (2014).
82. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
83. ACKERMAN, supra note 81, at 129, 131. R
84. Id. at 15.
85. Id. at 289 (“Loving v. Virginia . . . shifted legal attention away from the evil of institutionalized
humiliation.”).
86. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
87. Id. at 5 n.4. The statute made an exception to allow white persons to marry “persons who have
one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the American Indian and have no other non-Caucasic blood.” Id. at
5 n.4. Such individuals were “deemed to be white persons.” This exception was said to have been
accounted for by “‘the desire of all to recognize as an integral and honored part of the white race the
descendants of John Rolfe and Pocahontas.’” Id. at 5 n.4. (quoting Plecker, The New Family and Race
Improvement, 17 Va. Health Bull., Extra No. 12, at 25-26 (New Family Series No. 5, 1925)).
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supremacy, its opinion does not discuss the institutional humiliation of anti-
miscegenation laws.88
Ackerman contends that the opinion would have benefitted from a
deeper dive into the humiliations faced by couples like Mildred and Richard
Loving:
Warren could simply have appealed to his fellow Americans’ common sense,
describing how the marriage ban forced interracial couples to present their
relationship to the larger community as if it were diseased, disreputable, crim-
inal. A commonsense discussion of the countless humiliations of everyday
life would have yielded a far more compelling vindication of Brown’s con-
cerns with real-world stigma . . . .89
In addition to sidestepping the humiliation foisted upon the Lovings as a
couple, the Court mechanically applied strict scrutiny without discussing or
acknowledging the special humiliation that Mildred, as distinct from her
husband Richard, endured. Painful as the law must have been to Richard, it
was, after all, Mildred’s Blackness that in the State’s eyes deemed her un-
worthy of marrying a white man, that deemed their union an abomination.
Equal protection analysis continues today to embody a strict anti-classifica-
tion approach that, like in Loving, fails to deal directly and fully with the
impacts of institutionalized humiliation.90
Kenji Yoshino applauds Bruce Ackerman’s focus on institutional hu-
miliation and expands upon its tie to human dignity, pointing out that “[t]he
closest the Supreme Court has come to embracing the anti-humiliation prin-
ciple is through its use of the term ‘dignity.’”91 The Court has not always
used this term in a meaningful way, however. The strict anti-classification
approach, which rejects a focus on anti-subordination, invokes a hollow
concept of “dignity” that reviews it as automatically implicated by a partic-
ular classification, regardless of the reason for it or whom it benefits.92 For
example, Justice Kennedy stated, in concurring with a decision rejecting
voluntary school integration efforts in Seattle, “[T]o be forced to live under
a state-mandated racial label is inconsistent with the dignity of individuals
in our society.”93 Justice Kennedy did not elaborate on how white chil-
88. Id. at 11–12. Ackerman claims that this “swerve[ ] away from a strong reaffirmation of
Brown’s anti-humiliation principle” reflected Chief Justice Earl Warren’s desire to avoid imperiling
fragile yet real progress toward racial equality by “linking [the Court’s] decision too tightly Brown’s
emphatic condemnation” of school segregation. ACKERMAN, supra note 81, at 301. R
89. ACKERMAN, supra note 81, at 302. R
90. Id. at 289; Kenji Yoshino, The Anti-Humiliation Principle and Same-Sex Marriage, 123 YALE
L.J. 3076 (2014); see also supra note 53 (discussion of Hutchinson) R
91. Yoshino, supra note 52, at 3082.
92. See Hutchinson, supra note 53, at 27–33. R
93. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007) (Kennedy,
J., concurring); see also Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (striking down eligibility require-
ment limiting voters for trustees for Office of Hawaiian Affairs to “Hawaiians” or “native Hawaiians”
12
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dren’s dignity is violated by measures aimed at racial integration in schools.
Indeed, he recognized that those measures were aimed at remedying the
indignity caused by racial isolation. “A sense of stigma may already be-
come the fate of those separated out by circumstances beyond their immedi-
ate control. But to this the replication must be: Even so, measures other than
differential treatment based on racial typing of individuals first must be
exhausted.”94 The Court has even prioritized the dignity of states over that
of the right of persons of color to be free from race discrimination.95
While the Court’s race discrimination jurisprudence embraces an im-
poverished sense of “dignity,” the Court has robustly incorporated dignity
into its analyses in cases addressing the rights of gay, lesbian, and bisexual
persons. The Court has tended to define “dignity” more meaningfully in
these decisions, although it has done so without formally recognizing sexual
orientation as a suspect class and not always in the context of equal protec-
tion. In United States v. Windsor,96 for example, the Court held that restrict-
ing the federal interpretation of “marriage” and “spouse” in the Defense of
Marriage Act to apply only to opposite-sex unions violated the Due Process
Clause. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Windsor mentions dignity
nearly a dozen times.97 Dignity also played a central role in the Court’s
decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,98 which held that bans on same-sex mar-
riage violate the due process and equal protection clauses. Justice Kennedy
recognized that exclusion from full participation in society and social insti-
tutions demeans a person’s humanity:
The[ ] hope [of same-sex couples who wish to marry] is not to be condemned
to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization’s oldest institutions.
They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants
them that right.99
Montana’s Constitution expressly invites considerations of dignity
when analyzing an equal protection claim, since its equal protection clause
is located within a general section entitled “Individual Dignity.”100 Article
II, Section 4, of the Montana Constitution reads:
and noting that “it demeans a person’s dignity and worth to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or
her own merit and essential qualities.”).
94. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 798 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
95. Hutchinson, supra note 53, at 36–37 (discussing Shelby County v. Holder’s reliance on the R
“equal” “dignity” of states to invalidate Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2630–31
(2013)).
96. United States v. Windsor, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013); see also
Yoshino, supra note 90, at 3084–86 (discussing Windsor’s extensive references to “dignity”). R
97. Yoshino, supra note 90, at 3084. R
98. Obergefell v. Hodges, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015).
99. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
100. This article does not discuss whether there is a free-standing right to dignity under the Montana
Constitution, although such an argument is defensible and could well apply to bathroom panic laws as
an independent claim. Cf. Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1227–33 (Mont. 2009) (Nelson, J., concur-
13
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Individual Dignity. The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person
shall be denied equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any person,
firm, corporation, or institution shall discriminate against any person in the
exercise of his civil or political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture,
social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas.101
The Montana Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Montana’s equal
protection clause provides broader coverage of the right to equal treatment
than under the United States Constitution.102 But it has not explained how,
and its equal protection decisions so far have not incorporated dignity into
the analysis.103 The Court may be reluctant to apply the Montana dignity
clause because of the potentially open-ended or subjective nature of that
term. Matthew Clifford and Thomas Huff have offered a careful analysis of
the meaning and scope of the Montana dignity clause, including how it may
inform equal protection analysis.104 They point out that “the dignity right
could help us identify the suspect class” by focusing on the “degrading,
undignified treatment . . . the class receives.”105 Clifford and Huff recog-
nize that enforced social isolation based in animus toward a group is inher-
ently “degrading, because [such isolation] says the rest of the community
does not want to share its life with” the targeted group.106 The idea of isola-
tion as “degrading” echoes Ackerman’s identification of “institutionalized
humiliation” as the chief harm caused by racial segregation.107
Neomi Rao provides a useful taxonomy of dignity in American law
that helps illustrate how social isolation fits into a particular conception of
dignity. Rao identifies three forms of dignity: inherent dignity, substantive
ring) (arguing that the right to dignity is “a stand-alone, fundamental constitutional right”); Matthew O.
Clifford & Thomas P. Huff, Some Thoughts on the Meaning and Scope of the Montana Constitution’s
“Dignity” Clause with Possible Applications, 61 MONT. L. REV. 301, 305–07 (2000) (same).
101. MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 4.
102. See, e.g., Farrier v. Teacher’s Ret. Bd., 120 P.3d 390, 394 (Mont. 2005); Snetsinger v. Montana
Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445, 449 (Mont. 2003); Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Serv., 744 P.2d 895, 897 (Mont.
1987).
103. During his time on the Montana Supreme Court, Justice Jim Nelson repeatedly and eloquently,
in concurrences and dissents, argued for a free-standing right to dignity, as well as for an interpretation
of the equal protection clause that is grounded in Montana’s constitutional recognition of the inviolable
right to human dignity. See, e.g., Donaldson v. State, 292 P.3d 364, 376-77, 407 (Mont. 2012) (Nelson,
J., dissenting) (arguing for application of free-standing right to dignity); Baxter, 224 P.3d at 1227–33
(Nelson, J., concurring) (arguing for a free-standing right to dignity); Snetsinger, 104 P.3d at 459–60
(Nelson, J., concurring) (arguing for a conception of equal protection grounded in the right to dignity).
104. Clifford & Huff, supra note 100, at 332–35. R
105. Id. at 332.
106. Id. (discussing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that city’s
refusal to grant a zoning permit to allow a home for the intellectually disabled in a residential neighbor-
hood violated equal protection) and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that Colorado consti-
tutional amendment, which precluded any state action directed to protecting persons of “homosexual,
lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices, or relationships” violated equal protection)).
107. ACKERMAN, supra note 81, at 289. R
14
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dignity, and dignity as recognition.108 Inherent dignity “exists merely by
virtue of a person’s humanity and does not depend on intelligence, morality,
or social status,” nor does it “establish an external measure for what counts
as being dignified or worthy of respect.”109 This concept of dignity in
United States constitutional law is most often found in decisions addressing
freedom from government interference, including in speech, privacy, and
sexual relationships.110
Substantive dignity “serve[s] as the grounds for enforcing various sub-
stantive values.”111 It thus stands in contrast to intrinsic dignity in that it
requires living in a certain way (e.g., forbidding burqas to be worn in public
in France) and because, unlike inherent dignity, it can be lost if a person
does not adhere to the substantive norms. Substantive dignity is also associ-
ated with social-welfare rights or state protection against poverty and vio-
lence.112
Dignity as recognition “is rooted in a conception of the self as consti-
tuted by the broader community—a person’s identity and worth depend on
his relationship to society.”113 Dignity as recognition “requires protection
against the symbolic, expressive harms of policies that fail to respect the
worth of each individual and group.”114 This form of dignity is about being
received and accepted as a full participant in society, rather than being
marginalized and ostracized.
Inherent dignity and dignity as recognition are often conflated, espe-
cially in state and federal case law in the United States.115 Although both
forms of dignity may be implicated in a single case they are, however, dis-
tinct. Inherent dignity is possessed by every person and is not contingent on
outside factors; a person cannot lose inherent dignity.116 Because of inher-
ent dignity, the government is prohibited from denying all persons certain
rights, such as the right to free speech. The right to inherent dignity was at
issue in Lawrence v. Texas,117 where the Court held that the State could not
criminalize private, consensual sexual intimacy between two adults of the
same sex. The Lawrence Court’s use of “dignity” as tied to personal liberty
and freedom clearly invoked inherent dignity: “adults may choose to enter
108. Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183,
187–88 (2011).
109. Id. at 187.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 187–88.
113. Id. at 188.
114. Id. at 189, 267.
115. Id. at 267.
116. Id. at 187.
117. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 510 (2003).
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upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private
lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.”118 Similarly, in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,119 the Court invoked inherent dignity in its decision
upholding the constitutional right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy:
“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” In other
words, because individuals possess inherent dignity, the State cannot deny
their freedom to make decisions regarding sexual partners or childbearing.
The third form of dignity, dignity as recognition, relies on a person’s
being welcomed as a participant in public life and accepted as a member of
society.120 This form of dignity is contingent on such public recognition; a
person’s dignity can be taken from them by certain government actions.
This form of dignity was indirectly at issue in Lawrence as well, because
the State singling out same-sex intimacy for criminal prohibition repre-
sented a public condemnation of gay people’s identities.121 The Court rec-
ognized the State’s action as part of a long history of subordination, based
in animus toward gay persons.122 Moreover, the Texas law symbolically
ostracized gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons by branding them with a crim-
inal record: “The stigma this criminal statute imposes . . . is not trivial. The
offense, to be sure, is but . . . a minor offense in the Texas legal system.
Still, it remains a criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity of the
persons charged.”123
The right to dignity as recognition was more directly at issue in Wind-
sor and Obergefell, both of which addressed the right to public acceptance
of same-sex marriages.124 In Windsor, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
reflects the qualitative shift from inherent dignity in Lawrence to recogni-
tional dignity in Windsor. After noting Lawrence’s protection of private,
118. Id. at 567.
119. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
120. Rao, supra note 108, at 243. R
121. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (“for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn homo-
sexual conduct as immoral”).
122. Id.; see also Rao, supra note 108, at 257 (“The harm identified by the Court concerned both R
state and private discrimination and connected the legal prohibition on sodomy with a lack of acceptance
and tolerance by the community.”).
123. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
124. Windsor v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 2884, 2675, 2683, 2693 (2013) (ad-
dressing definition of “marriage” under Defense of Marriage Act); Obergefell v. Hodges, ___ U.S. ___,
___, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (addressing constitutional right of same-sex couples to marry). Rao
describes the right to marry as one implicating inherent dignity. Rao, supra note 108, at 267. However, R
insofar as Loving, Windsor, and Obergefell address the right to marriage as a legal status (as opposed to
the right to choose a committed same-sex relationship without requiring public recognition), they seem
rather to be concerned with recognitional dignity.
16
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intimate sex between adults of the same sex, the Court noted that New
York’s decision to recognize same-sex marriages as valid
sought to give further protection and dignity to that bond. For same-sex
couples who wished to be married, the State acted to give their . . . conduct a
. . . far-reaching legal acknowledgment of . . . a relationship deemed by the
State worthy of dignity in the community equal with all other marriages.125
In other words, same-sex couples were granted recognitional dignity, a dig-
nity they did not previously possess, when New York decided to legally
recognize their marriages.
Unless substantive dignity or dignity as recognition are implicated, the
constitutional right to dignity should not be at issue. Where there is no
history of subordination, ostracizing, stigma, or systematic denial of the ba-
sic conditions of human flourishing, there are no grounds for recognizing a
right to dignity independent of the freedom infringed by government action.
We would not say, for example, that a neo-Nazi’s constitutional right to
dignity is violated or implicated if a state infringes his constitutional right to
free speech. The reason it made sense for the Court in Lawrence to speak of
dignity in connection with the criminalization of same-sex intimacy was
because that denial of freedom was so closely linked to institutional humili-
ation, or the denial of recognitional dignity.
Dignity as recognition and the anti-humiliation principle are fully at
play in anti-transgender bathroom panic legislation. Denial of public ac-
commodations to historically oppressed and marginalized groups is a re-
fusal to recognize and welcome members of such groups as full participants
in society. Kenji Yoshino notes that “gay rights have always been plagued
by a politics of shame.”126 This is equally true of transgender rights. Dis-
crimination against transgender individuals predominantly seeks to stigma-
tize and exclude them from being visible or even present in public. Bath-
room panic laws do exactly that. As James Essex points out, “When trans-
gender individuals are barred from using restrooms that match who they
are, they are essentially closed off from participating in public life.”127 A
person cannot use public buildings, parks, and other facilities if they are
unable to use the restrooms in those facilities. Indeed, transgender children
and adults prohibited from using the restroom consistent with their gender
identity commonly deny themselves nutrition and hydration in order to
avoid the need to go to the bathroom.128 Thus, bathroom panic laws are a
125. Windsor, ___ U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (emphasis added).
126. Yoshino, supra note 90, at 3087. R
127. James Esseks, Transgender People and Single-Sex Places, ACLU, (June 2, 2016, 6:15 p.m.),
https://perma.cc/F4X8-GXPE.
128. Herman, supra note 14, at 229; see also Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. R
Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1040–41 (7th Cir. 2017) (describing harms resulting from
transgender teenager’s restricted water intake and attempts to avoid using any restroom at school).
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remarkably effective tool for undermining transgender persons’ status as
equal members of society. Judge Davis’s opinion in Gavin Grimm’s case
recognized this by referencing the violation of transgender individuals’
“core dignity” and the way in which bathroom panic laws and policies force
transgender people to “exist on the margins.”129 President Trump’s August
25, 2017, Presidential Memorandum banning transgender individuals from
serving in the United States military is another stark instance of excluding
transgender people from full participation in society.130
Montana equal protection law should identify when dignity as recogni-
tion is implicated by government actions like bathroom panic legislation.
When it is, strict scrutiny should apply. Because the Montana Supreme
Court has so far applied the tiers of scrutiny in a formalistic way, it has not
yet made explicit the connection between equal protection and the right to
dignity within which the equal protection right is located. This is somewhat
surprising, since the Court has infused a dignity analysis into its interpreta-
tion of fundamental rights in the Montana Constitution not located within
Article II, Section 4 (the dignity provision). For example, in Walker v.
State,131 the Montana Supreme Court interpreted the Montana Constitu-
tion’s protections against cruel and unusual punishment to be broader than
under the federal constitution because it read that provision in conjunction
with the Montana Constitution’s dignity provision.
The factors that federal courts and the Montana Supreme Court have
used to determine whether discrimination targets a suspect class do indi-
rectly point to dignity as recognition by looking to any history of discrimi-
nation against the targeted class.132 In her opinion granting a preliminary
injunction against President Trump’s ban on military service by transgender
individuals, United States District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly acknowl-
edged that, “[a]s a class, transgender individuals have suffered, and con-
tinue to suffer, severe persecution and discrimination.”133 Because of this
129. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 853 F.3d 729, 730–31 (4th Cir. 2017) (Davis,
J., concurring).
130. Military Service by Transgender Individuals, 82 Fed. Reg. 41319 (Aug. 25, 2017). The ban is
currently preliminarily enjoined. Doe v. Trump, Civil Action No. 17-1597 (CKK), ___ F. Supp. 3d. ___,
2017 WL 4873042 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2017); Dave Phillips, Second Judge Blocks Trump’s Transgender
Ban in the Military, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/9FZN-GP4L. On Decem-
ber 30, 2017, the Justice Department announced that the ban is on hold (although it will apparently
continue to defend the ban in court). Transgender People Cleared to Join Military, For Now, NBC
NEWS (Dec. 30, 2017 6:15 PM ET), https://perma.cc/79QM-VRNS; see supra note at 127 (discussing
court’s ruling).
131. Walker v. State, 68 P.3d 872, 883 (Mont. 2003).
132. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing these factors). Kenji Yoshino, Assimila- R
tionist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,”
108 YALE L.J. 485, 489 (1998).
133. Doe, ___ F. Supp. 3d. at ___, 2017 WL at *27.
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history, Judge Kollar-Kotelly found that transgender discrimination triggers
heightened scrutiny.134 Arguably, the political vulnerability factor is also
tied to recognitional dignity in that it reflects a group’s isolation or exclu-
sion from full participation in public life. The Montana Supreme Court’s
equal protection analysis and its decisions whether to apply strict scrutiny
would benefit from more extensive and express attention to “the countless
humiliations of everyday life” that a history of discrimination and exclusion
from political life imposes, including social isolation, stigma, harassment,
and violence.135
Thus, in Montana, subjecting discrimination against oppressed and
marginalized groups to strict scrutiny is expressly justified, if not dictated,
by the placement of Montana’s Equal Protection Clause within the frame-
work of dignity. Other potential consequences of relying on dignity to in-
form equal protection analysis could explain why bare assertions of dis-
crimination based on a given classification, such as race, should not always
merit strict scrutiny. Affirmative action is one such example. When a white
person claims that an affirmative action program has discriminated against
her based on race, dignity as recognition is not implicated.136 White people
have not historically suffered exclusions from full participation in public
life.137 But that is beyond the scope of this Essay. In the case of transgender
discrimination in public accommodations, dignity as recognition is clearly
implicated, and the case for applying strict scrutiny is at its strongest.
V. CONCLUSION
Case outcomes are important. But where discrimination involves pub-
lic shunning, stigma, and banishment from participation in public life, a
court’s infusion of the right to dignity into its analysis can itself serve to
recognize and say to transgender people: this court sees you and recognizes
you as a full member of society—and our Constitution demands that the
public recognize you as well. Judge Andre Davis saw how important it was
to recognize, through the formal means of a judicial opinion, a Virginia
school board’s attack on a transgender teenager’s dignity, to recognize the
way that it forced him to exist at the margins of public life.138 Applying a
134. Id. at ___, 2017 WL at *27–28; see also Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1051 (acknowl-
edging that “transgender individuals face discrimination, harassment, and violence because of their gen-
der identity” but declining to answer whether “transgender status should be entitled to heightened scru-
tiny in its own right”).
135. Yoshino, supra note 90, at 3080. R
136. See Rao, supra note 108, at 262. R
137. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussion of hollow concept of dignity in the Su- R
preme Court’s race discrimination cases); Hutchinson, supra note 53 at 27-33.
138. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 853 F.3d 729, 730 (4th Cir. 2017) (Davis, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
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dignity-infused approach to equal protection in the context of transgender
discrimination might yield this adaptation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s fa-
mous statement in Brown: “To separate transgender persons from others in
public accommodations solely because they are transgender conveys a mes-
sage of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”139 Such an approach
would allow courts to focus on the human cost of discrimination against
transgender persons. The Montana Constitution not only allows for this in-
fusion of dignity into equal protection analysis but it demands it.
139. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
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